Shifting paradigms? US sanctions policy in the Persian Gulf

Now we may actually be within sight of a diplomatic rapprochement between Iran and the West, the political salience of sanctions has never been greater. Currently, they are being heralded as the tool that brought the Iranians to the table. However, we should not be too hasty in hailing them as the panacea of international relations.

Economic sanctions – that is, measures imposed by one or more states against another entity that withdraw or change normal economic relations in order to achieve policy objectives – are an oft-misunderstood mechanism of statecraft, one which leaders misleadingly portray as a peaceful, humanitarian alternative to war. However, behind the noble causes espoused by a sanctioning government, the core objectives of a sanctions regime are often depressingly realist.

To demonstrate this, a comparison of the respective sanctions experiences of Hussein’s Iraq and Khamenei’s Iran is a good place to start. While each set differs in terms of its severity and the mechanism by which it operated, it seems that (until recently, at least) they were both motivated by one overarching goal: the perpetuation of US hegemony in the Persian Gulf. On the back of such an analysis, one is better able to understand just how significant last month’s Geneva deal is. Indeed, it could symbolise the beginning of what would be a profound shift in US-Persian Gulf relations, hitherto unthinkable.

I need not go into specifics, but Washington’s relationship with Baghdad and Tehran has long been rocky. However, it was not until after the Cold War ended that the US de factoand de jure labelled Hussein and Khamenei as the new bogeymen of the world – its foremost “backlash” states – and set about ensuring their strategic limitation. Step in, sanctions.

We were (and are) told that sanctions are a means of bringing about behaviour change, but when behaviour change came about in both Iraq and Iran, the goalposts were moved and the sanctions remained in place. Clearly, other objectives were at work here.

First among them is symbolism, something that is an intrinsic value of sanctions. By enforcing them on a multilateral level against Iraq through the United Nations, the United States was able to pull a red card on Hussein after his invasion of Kuwait. Their implementation signalled that any state engaging in a war of aggression (in particular one that threatens United States interests) will be punished, and severely.

With Iran, the symbolic value of sanctions is also present. Indeed, throughout the 1990s, the sanctions enforced by Washington were ineffective tools, more of a feel-good policy than anything else. But after 9/11 and 2002’s nuclear revelation, everything began to change. In subsequent years, no longer were sanctions just a means of showing that the US government was “doing something” – by the mid-2000s they had become a means of buoying up the confidence of US allies, making sure that no one started a war against Iran that Washington would inevitably be drawn into.

Reaping their symbolic value, though, is by no means the Holy Grail of any sanctions policy. Sure, it is a benefit, but what is infinitely more attractive is their ability to strategically contain a threat.

This can clearly be seen in both Iraq and Iran’s cases. From the outset, the sanctions had the official aim of deterring objectionable policies. However, for both Iraq and Iran these same policies were based on a perceived need to guarantee the existence of both the nation. Both Baghdad and Tehran felt they faced an existential threat – be it from the U.S. or Israel – that could only be deterred through the acquisition of a strong W.M.D capability. And, in a case like this, when a state feels it faces an existential threat, it will not yield to even the most immense levels of pressure.

The sanctioners did know this (as stated in the Iraq Survey Group’s Final Report and thisleaked diplomatic cable about Iran), so it follows that the reason they implemented these measures must be something other than as coercive instruments. Most likely, it is all aboutcontainment.

By enforcing economic paralysis upon its rivals, the US hobbles them without having to drop a bomb or fire a torpedo. This is exactly what we saw with Hussein’s Iraq, which transitioned from a formidable military opponent into little more than a paper tiger over the course of the 1990s. While the Iran sanctions are a different kettle of fish, recently in particular, the impact they have had is worryingly similar.

Some years ago, a Clinton official said that sanctions put Hussein in a strategic box. In the last decade, that is exactly what they have been attempting to do with Iran, though with markedly more obstacles.

What it all seems to boil down to is that sanctions, as the principle bedrock of containment, are an alternative to war (and an un-humanitarian one at that). Just as with war, a containment policy is simply a means of political engineering. This is nothing too controversial. However, in certain cases, Iraq one of them, sanctions can morph into being a precursor to war, a means of preparing the target state for military action.

When the Iraq Liberation Act was passed in 1998, regime change became the overarching ambition of the United States and, thus, the only conclusion to the sanctions became war. That is, unless ILA was repealed (which it wouldn’t be) or Saddam Hussein packed up his government and ceded power to (friendly) democratic forces (which he certainly wouldn’t do). From 1998, then, the sanctions were principally aimed at paving the way for what was intended to be a cakewalk of a war.

Now, with Iran, this is not the case, at least for now. In the last couple of years, it could easily have become so. But, as the recent diplomatic success in Geneva demonstrates more than anything, despite Congress’ calls for regime change and pre-emptive strikes, Washington’s heart’s desire is not the total transformation of the Iranian political status quo, as it was with Iraq. Rather, at present, Washington’s heart’s desire is simply to inhibit Iran’s ability to project its regional influence and stop Israel from starting a war.

A study of the Iraqi experience gives one the tools they need to navigate the murky waters of the Iran sanctions, and suggests some useful paradigms as to what future direction Washington might travel in. After last week’s success in Geneva, though, it seems that perhaps these paradigms are shifting for the better.

One can only hope that we are right and that failure is not a foregone conclusion for the next six months worth of talks, that these are not sham negotiations held in an attempt to prove that all the alternatives to military action have been exhausted. It has, after all, been done before.

One week on - where do we stand?

Last Saturday a deal was struck – a deal that may well transform beyond recognition some of the most familiar paradigms of Middle Eastern power politics.

Feeling rebuffed by the United States, a furious Israel now has more in common with Saudi Arabia than anywhere else and is hailing France as its new preferred partner in crime. Only time will tell if we’ll see a return to the old status quo but, in the meantime, it is worth re-examining the current state of play.

Disappointingly, but inevitably, the interim agreement – under which Iran pledged that it would freeze its nuclear programme in exchange for measured sanctions relief and recognition of its right to enrich uranium – has been greeted with as much anger as it has applause.

No one has been more outspoken about this than Bibi Netanyahu (no surprises there). Indeed, Tel Aviv was quick to condemn the agreement immediately after it was reached. 

The following day, Netanyahu called it an “historic mistake” and announced that he had plans to dispatch a team – headed up by his national security adviser, Yossi Cohen – to Washington this week to exercise damage limitation in the negotiations to come.

It is important to keep this all in perspective for, while the agreement does change things, it by doesn’t present a permanent solution and, as one Israeli official announced this week, “the ball is still in play”: there are six long months of further discussions to go.

So, while it may have started on its way, Iran is not out of the red yet and, to a large extent, the real hard work has only just begun. Now, the United States and the rest of the world need to placate and appease a very angry Israel, an Israel that is sure to obstruct at every step of the way in the upcoming negotiations.

According to Netanyahu, Tel Aviv will not accept anything but its maximum, unrealistic demand that Iran’s nuclear programme is totally dismantled. In his warped worldview, this deal is actually a step back – because of it, “the most dangerous regime in the world has taken a significant step toward attaining the most dangerous weapon in the world”. Does anyone else shiver at Bibi’s almost nostalgic reference to Bush Jr?

It is remarkable how the Israeli PM can create something out of nothing, for well-known is the fact that the core of a nuclear bomb requires 90% enriched uranium. Under this new deal, though, the Islamic Republic will be able to haltingly enrich to a mere 5%.

Clearly, the usual scaremongers are acting as normal, doing what they do best and trying as hard as they can to derail the process of reconciliation, sparing, in Mohammad Zarif’s words, “no pretext and device to bring the deal to nothing”. 

LOSING A FRIEND, AND MUCH MORE

At the end of February 2010, an important dinner took place in Damascus among three of the most hated Washington enemies: hosted by the Syrian President Bashar Al Assad, the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hezbollah’s leader Assan Nasrallah met to reinforce their “deep and brotherly ties” and condemn the Israeli and Western influence in the region. After more than one year and half, Damascus is no more a safer place to hold such meetings. With the Syrian situation escalating into an eventual civil war, Bashar finds himself isolated in the Arab community and in the world. At the moment, regime’s supporters can be counted on one hand, and Iran is the thumb.

Throughout the Middle East changing political dynamics of the last years, Iran and Syria have developed strong ties, based on shared strategic and political interests that are still vital for their governments –the above mentioned meeting is a good example of the crucial Iran-Syria-Hezbollah alliance. The uprising of the Syrian opposition movement has not changed the basic structure of this partnership, but some glimmers of change can be seen in the current developments. The problem with Syria for Tehran is that Bashar is not able to settle the situation: Syria is collapsing into chaos, and this is deeply affecting the Iranian interests in the Middle East. Ahmadinejad’ government has declared in several occasions its support forthe current Syrian regime, accusing Western powers to fuel the struggle, while Iranian military forces are reported to have helped the Syrian Army in organizing the repression. Under strong Iranian pressure, Assan Nasrallah has renewed the support of Hezbollah to the Al Assad’s regime in a rare public speech, and voices are circulating about a possible military direct involvement of Shiite fighters, if the situation for Bashar will get worse. On the other hand, Tehran authorities have issued some statements inviting Damascus to adopt a more moderate course in dealing with the demonstrators, and meetings between Iranian officials and groups of the opposition were held in the past months – Tehran’s preferences go to the non-Islamist groups of the opposition, especially after the Syrian National Council leader stated that a new Syria would break its military ties with Iran and Hezbollah. These moves reflect the Iranian priorities in the area: avoid foreign intervention by taking Syria back to a more stable situation. The “Libyanization” of Syria is not an option for Tehran, especially after the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, and considering that the military operations are driven by Turkey. Persian-Turkish relations are not that good as they were a year ago, when Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan even supported the Iranian nuclear ambitions with the Tehran Declaration. Some contrasts have arisen from the Turkish increasing activism in the Middle East affairs and especially from an eventual deployment of the anti-Iranian NATO missile shield on Turkish soil.

Stabilize Syria is also the priority for several other actors involved in the issue, affecting Iranian calculus in the issue. Despite having vetoed a UN Security Council Resolution, condemned foreign intervention, and while dispatching an aircraft carrier to the naval base of Tartus, Russia is becoming more concerned of the developments in Syria. A definite escalation of the protest into a military confrontation would weaken Moscow’s position, increasing the support for a military action, probably with Turkish decisive involvement. Limiting Turkish expansionism in the region is an Iranian goal, as we have seen, but also it is shared by another crucial regional actor, for the moment at the margins: Israel. Israeli authorities would welcome the collapse of Assad regime, especially if this would mean a big blow against Hezbollah. But an eventual Islamic government also on its northern borders is worrying Israeli strategists, after the success of Islamists movements in Egypt. Also in the Arab community some interesting dynamics are taking place. Qatar has taken a strong anti Assad stance since the beginning of the uprising, but its positive relations with Tehran would be harmfully influenced by a more aggressive position. The great Iranian regional competitor, Saudi Arabia, is not standing aside, and a rare visit of Iran’s intelligence chief, Heidar Moshlei, to Saudi Crown Prince, Nayef bin Abdel-Aziz Al Saud, has become a much speculated issue in the last days, with several possible issues at the centre of their meeting: Bahrain, the alleged Saudi Ambassador in the US murder plot, Iraq, regional security, and oil price.

It is really impossible to predict if and when the Syrian government will fall, and who will take the lead of the Syrian population in this event. Iran has much at stake in the issue, with huge implications for its foreign policy and interests in the Middle East: the collapse of the best ally in the region would surely affected Tehran’s power projection in the entire area, further isolating the regime, and this will surely have consequences also on the internal Persian power balance of the Islamic Republic.