Now we may actually be within sight of a diplomatic rapprochement between Iran and the West, the political salience of sanctions has never been greater. Currently, they are being heralded as the tool that brought the Iranians to the table. However, we should not be too hasty in hailing them as the panacea of international relations.
Economic sanctions – that is, measures imposed by one or more states against another entity that withdraw or change normal economic relations in order to achieve policy objectives – are an oft-misunderstood mechanism of statecraft, one which leaders misleadingly portray as a peaceful, humanitarian alternative to war. However, behind the noble causes espoused by a sanctioning government, the core objectives of a sanctions regime are often depressingly realist.
To demonstrate this, a comparison of the respective sanctions experiences of Hussein’s Iraq and Khamenei’s Iran is a good place to start. While each set differs in terms of its severity and the mechanism by which it operated, it seems that (until recently, at least) they were both motivated by one overarching goal: the perpetuation of US hegemony in the Persian Gulf. On the back of such an analysis, one is better able to understand just how significant last month’s Geneva deal is. Indeed, it could symbolise the beginning of what would be a profound shift in US-Persian Gulf relations, hitherto unthinkable.
I need not go into specifics, but Washington’s relationship with Baghdad and Tehran has long been rocky. However, it was not until after the Cold War ended that the US de factoand de jure labelled Hussein and Khamenei as the new bogeymen of the world – its foremost “backlash” states – and set about ensuring their strategic limitation. Step in, sanctions.
We were (and are) told that sanctions are a means of bringing about behaviour change, but when behaviour change came about in both Iraq and Iran, the goalposts were moved and the sanctions remained in place. Clearly, other objectives were at work here.
First among them is symbolism, something that is an intrinsic value of sanctions. By enforcing them on a multilateral level against Iraq through the United Nations, the United States was able to pull a red card on Hussein after his invasion of Kuwait. Their implementation signalled that any state engaging in a war of aggression (in particular one that threatens United States interests) will be punished, and severely.
With Iran, the symbolic value of sanctions is also present. Indeed, throughout the 1990s, the sanctions enforced by Washington were ineffective tools, more of a feel-good policy than anything else. But after 9/11 and 2002’s nuclear revelation, everything began to change. In subsequent years, no longer were sanctions just a means of showing that the US government was “doing something” – by the mid-2000s they had become a means of buoying up the confidence of US allies, making sure that no one started a war against Iran that Washington would inevitably be drawn into.
Reaping their symbolic value, though, is by no means the Holy Grail of any sanctions policy. Sure, it is a benefit, but what is infinitely more attractive is their ability to strategically contain a threat.
This can clearly be seen in both Iraq and Iran’s cases. From the outset, the sanctions had the official aim of deterring objectionable policies. However, for both Iraq and Iran these same policies were based on a perceived need to guarantee the existence of both the nation. Both Baghdad and Tehran felt they faced an existential threat – be it from the U.S. or Israel – that could only be deterred through the acquisition of a strong W.M.D capability. And, in a case like this, when a state feels it faces an existential threat, it will not yield to even the most immense levels of pressure.
The sanctioners did know this (as stated in the Iraq Survey Group’s Final Report and thisleaked diplomatic cable about Iran), so it follows that the reason they implemented these measures must be something other than as coercive instruments. Most likely, it is all aboutcontainment.
By enforcing economic paralysis upon its rivals, the US hobbles them without having to drop a bomb or fire a torpedo. This is exactly what we saw with Hussein’s Iraq, which transitioned from a formidable military opponent into little more than a paper tiger over the course of the 1990s. While the Iran sanctions are a different kettle of fish, recently in particular, the impact they have had is worryingly similar.
Some years ago, a Clinton official said that sanctions put Hussein in a strategic box. In the last decade, that is exactly what they have been attempting to do with Iran, though with markedly more obstacles.
What it all seems to boil down to is that sanctions, as the principle bedrock of containment, are an alternative to war (and an un-humanitarian one at that). Just as with war, a containment policy is simply a means of political engineering. This is nothing too controversial. However, in certain cases, Iraq one of them, sanctions can morph into being a precursor to war, a means of preparing the target state for military action.
When the Iraq Liberation Act was passed in 1998, regime change became the overarching ambition of the United States and, thus, the only conclusion to the sanctions became war. That is, unless ILA was repealed (which it wouldn’t be) or Saddam Hussein packed up his government and ceded power to (friendly) democratic forces (which he certainly wouldn’t do). From 1998, then, the sanctions were principally aimed at paving the way for what was intended to be a cakewalk of a war.
Now, with Iran, this is not the case, at least for now. In the last couple of years, it could easily have become so. But, as the recent diplomatic success in Geneva demonstrates more than anything, despite Congress’ calls for regime change and pre-emptive strikes, Washington’s heart’s desire is not the total transformation of the Iranian political status quo, as it was with Iraq. Rather, at present, Washington’s heart’s desire is simply to inhibit Iran’s ability to project its regional influence and stop Israel from starting a war.
A study of the Iraqi experience gives one the tools they need to navigate the murky waters of the Iran sanctions, and suggests some useful paradigms as to what future direction Washington might travel in. After last week’s success in Geneva, though, it seems that perhaps these paradigms are shifting for the better.
One can only hope that we are right and that failure is not a foregone conclusion for the next six months worth of talks, that these are not sham negotiations held in an attempt to prove that all the alternatives to military action have been exhausted. It has, after all, been done before.
