The unthinkable implications of a Geneva failure

I am surprised: a detente between Iran and the rest of the world might actually be on the horizon.

Though it goes against my gut instinct given the players involved, tomorrow we could be looking at an interim agreement between Tehran, Washington and the rest of the P5+1 states, a first step on the way towards a true softening of relations.

For the first time in many years, the two most important figures in the discussion, US Secretary of State John Kerry and his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Zarif, seem to be ready to improvise, adapt and, if need be, compromise (a word hitherto unknown to both Iran and the United States) – the combination of both has given a much needed breath of fresh air to the diplomatic track, and it seems like their new approach could, against all the odds, actually pay off.

Needless to say, the road ahead isn’t clear. Not in the slightest. Though it would be wonderfully simple to do so, one simply cannot ignore Benjamin Netanyahu’s – or, for that matter, Ali Khamenei’s – petty, bellicose rhetoric. Nor can one dismiss as a paper tiger Congress’ latest threat that it will impose new sanctions, something that would surely be the next step in the United States’ march to war. And, while Khamenei has clearly ceded substantial diplomatic power to Iran’s elected officials, it is safe to say that this is be a temporary lease of authority rather than something permanent.

Not only do both sides have conflicting red lines, they are drawn amidst many obstacles that litter the way forward and there is also only a finite period within which real progress may be made.

So, amidst all this optimism, it is important that we anticipate the worst – if only to keep in mind what the alternative to a successful outcome is for, if this week concludes in failure – on the part of the Iranians or otherwise – we will be back to much worse than square one:

Iran will once again be on the defensive, enriching uranium with more urgency than ever, thus Tel Aviv’s tenuous justification for a pre-emptive strike will be much reinforced and Congress will likely succeed in piling on new sanctions (which, as always, will not work). If these talks fail, Washington’s warmongers will be able to gleefully rejoice in the fact that the diplomatic track – which, for the first time in an age seemed to have had wind in its sails – has unambiguously failed.

It is imperative that this hypothetical scenario does not become reality. Let’s hope that those participating agree.