LOSING A FRIEND, AND MUCH MORE

At the end of February 2010, an important dinner took place in Damascus among three of the most hated Washington enemies: hosted by the Syrian President Bashar Al Assad, the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hezbollah’s leader Assan Nasrallah met to reinforce their “deep and brotherly ties” and condemn the Israeli and Western influence in the region. After more than one year and half, Damascus is no more a safer place to hold such meetings. With the Syrian situation escalating into an eventual civil war, Bashar finds himself isolated in the Arab community and in the world. At the moment, regime’s supporters can be counted on one hand, and Iran is the thumb.

Throughout the Middle East changing political dynamics of the last years, Iran and Syria have developed strong ties, based on shared strategic and political interests that are still vital for their governments –the above mentioned meeting is a good example of the crucial Iran-Syria-Hezbollah alliance. The uprising of the Syrian opposition movement has not changed the basic structure of this partnership, but some glimmers of change can be seen in the current developments. The problem with Syria for Tehran is that Bashar is not able to settle the situation: Syria is collapsing into chaos, and this is deeply affecting the Iranian interests in the Middle East. Ahmadinejad’ government has declared in several occasions its support forthe current Syrian regime, accusing Western powers to fuel the struggle, while Iranian military forces are reported to have helped the Syrian Army in organizing the repression. Under strong Iranian pressure, Assan Nasrallah has renewed the support of Hezbollah to the Al Assad’s regime in a rare public speech, and voices are circulating about a possible military direct involvement of Shiite fighters, if the situation for Bashar will get worse. On the other hand, Tehran authorities have issued some statements inviting Damascus to adopt a more moderate course in dealing with the demonstrators, and meetings between Iranian officials and groups of the opposition were held in the past months – Tehran’s preferences go to the non-Islamist groups of the opposition, especially after the Syrian National Council leader stated that a new Syria would break its military ties with Iran and Hezbollah. These moves reflect the Iranian priorities in the area: avoid foreign intervention by taking Syria back to a more stable situation. The “Libyanization” of Syria is not an option for Tehran, especially after the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, and considering that the military operations are driven by Turkey. Persian-Turkish relations are not that good as they were a year ago, when Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan even supported the Iranian nuclear ambitions with the Tehran Declaration. Some contrasts have arisen from the Turkish increasing activism in the Middle East affairs and especially from an eventual deployment of the anti-Iranian NATO missile shield on Turkish soil.

Stabilize Syria is also the priority for several other actors involved in the issue, affecting Iranian calculus in the issue. Despite having vetoed a UN Security Council Resolution, condemned foreign intervention, and while dispatching an aircraft carrier to the naval base of Tartus, Russia is becoming more concerned of the developments in Syria. A definite escalation of the protest into a military confrontation would weaken Moscow’s position, increasing the support for a military action, probably with Turkish decisive involvement. Limiting Turkish expansionism in the region is an Iranian goal, as we have seen, but also it is shared by another crucial regional actor, for the moment at the margins: Israel. Israeli authorities would welcome the collapse of Assad regime, especially if this would mean a big blow against Hezbollah. But an eventual Islamic government also on its northern borders is worrying Israeli strategists, after the success of Islamists movements in Egypt. Also in the Arab community some interesting dynamics are taking place. Qatar has taken a strong anti Assad stance since the beginning of the uprising, but its positive relations with Tehran would be harmfully influenced by a more aggressive position. The great Iranian regional competitor, Saudi Arabia, is not standing aside, and a rare visit of Iran’s intelligence chief, Heidar Moshlei, to Saudi Crown Prince, Nayef bin Abdel-Aziz Al Saud, has become a much speculated issue in the last days, with several possible issues at the centre of their meeting: Bahrain, the alleged Saudi Ambassador in the US murder plot, Iraq, regional security, and oil price.

It is really impossible to predict if and when the Syrian government will fall, and who will take the lead of the Syrian population in this event. Iran has much at stake in the issue, with huge implications for its foreign policy and interests in the Middle East: the collapse of the best ally in the region would surely affected Tehran’s power projection in the entire area, further isolating the regime, and this will surely have consequences also on the internal Persian power balance of the Islamic Republic.