Iran and the Question of Nuclear
Weapons
Key observation: Analysis of Iran’s position
on the acquisition of nuclear weapons is complicated by the often contradictory
statements that come out of Tehran. Further adding to this
difficulty in pinpointing a clear policy is the fact that Iran's nuclear
programme is not organised within any ministry. It is handled by an autonomous
organisation only formally dependent on the President for its organisation.
Note that the hardline clerics want nuclear weapons.
Further note that the Council of Guardians, which is the
supreme political body in Iran, has delegated decisions on all matters
concerning the defence of the nation to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC). It therefore follows that the
IRGC may already have a covert nuclear weapons programme that is unknown to the
mainstream in the Iranian political establishment.
Iran continues to deny that it has a nuclear weapons
programme. In May 2008, Iran told the
International Atomic Energy Agency, “The Islamic Republic of Iran has not had
and shall not have any nuclear weapons program.”[1] Notwithstanding
this statement, Iran has had ambitions to obtain nuclear weapons in the past. Iran
is developing transferrable nuclear energy technology that can be used to help develop
nuclear weapons.
The European Union (EU) is so concerned that it has just imposed
new unilateral sanctions on Iran a few days ago on July 26th. The sanctions were imposed on Iran’s energy
sector, as well as on foreign trade and financial services. Their objective is
to pressure Iran to re-enter talks on its nuclear programme. EU foreign policy
chief Catherine Ashton said, "We want to see dialogue on nuclear weapons
capability to start as soon as possible in order to reach an agreement."
On the same day, Canada announced it was also tightening sanctions against Iran.
Canada’s sanctions target Iran’s energy and banking sectors, with the intention
of, “Slowing the progress of the Iranian authorities' nuclear, chemical, and
biological and missile programs.”
The Supreme Leader and Government Figures
The Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei is alleged to have issued a fatwa forbidding the production,
stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons on August 9th 2005. The text of the fatwa was alluded to in
an official statement at a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) in Vienna. However, the exact text of the fatwa has never been seen and
is not listed on the Supreme Leader’s website where other fatwas are published. A major doubt therefore remains as to the weight
that can be attributed to the fatwa. The
NCF has repeatedly requested a copy but it has never been made available
despite assurances that it would be produced.
Nevertheless, in April
2010, Khamenei reaffirmed the alleged fatwa
stating, “the use of nuclear arms is forbidden by Islam.” [2]
This was underlined by Ali
Larijani, former chief nuclear negotiator for Iran when he claimed that, “Iran
is a country governed in respect of religious values. The Supreme Leader established a fatwa which
states that to have access to / to seek nuclear weapons is “haram”,
forbidden. Not only nuclear arms, but
also chemical and biological. This explanation places all countries which
possess nuclear weapons in the rank of the ‘infidel’.”[3]
This position is
regularly endorsed by government officials. Khamenei has stated, “Our officials
have said it, the people have accepted it, governments have said it, and I have
repeatedly said we are not after nuclear weapons.” [4] This
position is also repeated in private. In an off-the-record discussion on 15th
August 2007, Source 001 said, “We have no plan for
weapons. This is a diplomatic war of the US against Iran. They see a strategic
challenge coming from Iran and use the nuclear issue to challenge Iran.” In
a later meeting in June 2009, Source 001 said that, “At the present time we in
Iran have no nuclear weapons. In the future will we have nuclear weapons? Maybe
- maybe not.” This seems to suggest a less clear cut stance. However, later at
the same meeting Source 001 returned to the familiar position stating, “On the
14th Khordad (the 4th June), the Supreme Leader said that using nuclear weapons
is "haram". Nuclear weapons are not right for any country. Not
producing nuclear weapons. Not using nuclear weapons. Not even keeping nuclear
weapons.”
The President
The
Iranian President also reaffirmed that the Islamic Republic was “against the
atomic bomb”, criticising the nuclear powers who are equipped with this weapon
and yet defend non-proliferation. “We consider atomic weapons inhumane,” he
affirmed.[5]
Yet Mahmoud Ahmadinejad welcomes nuclear technology. Ahmadinejad’s government
sees the pursuit of nuclear technology as a bulwark with which to offset
internal discontent within its own ranks.[6]
Reformist Opposition
While the opposition does not speak about nuclear weapons, it
does take a position on Iran’s right to nuclear technology. Before and after the June 2009 presidential
elections, Mir Hossein Moussavi, now the most identifiable leader of the Green
Movement, supported Iran’s right to uranium enrichment. To defy the official
line and undermine Iran’s right to nuclear technology is presented as a
betrayal of the national interest, but to support it bolsters Ahmadinejad who is
adept at taking all the credit; for staying the course; going toe-to-toe with
the ‘imperialist’ West. Thus, Mousavi
has stated, “While recognising that the current situation has been brought
about by adventurism and a lack of foresight in our nation’s diplomatic
relations, we cannot condone the sanctions which will have a direct impact on
our people’s lives. And therefore notwithstanding the challenging situation
facing us, we stand, without the slightest compunction, in the same line as our
nation.” If the population of Iran were to get behind a
drive for nuclear weapons, the opposition leaders are not strong enough to go
against this, nor could the opposition prevent the government from acquiring
nuclear weapons if they made the decision to do so.
The Revolutionary Guard
Iran
does not want a war. However, the Islamic Republic has become increasingly
militarised during Ahmadinejad’s two presidential terms. The Revolutionary Guard are pragmatic hardliners,
shaped by the Iran-Iraq war that began shortly after the Islamic
revolution. A war triggered because of
suspected nuclear weapons would not necessarily be a negative development for
the Guards. It would increase their
authority still further. They are
growing closer to the President. Ahmadinejad’s
Cabinet contains no fewer than five high-ranking Guardsmen. They are:
·
Masoud
Mir Kazemi, Oil Minister
·
Ahmad
Vahidi, Defence Minister
·
Sadeq
Mahsouli, Social Welfare Minister
·
Mohamed
Mostafa Najjar, Interior Minister
·
Manouchehr Mottaki, Foreign Minister
Clerics
The alleged fatwa of
the Supreme Leader does not represent a universally accepted opinion. In 2006,
one of Iran's hardline clerics, Mohsen
Gharavian,[7]
issued a fatwa sanctioning the use of atomic weapons against Iran’s enemies. This questioned the theocracy's traditional stance that Sharia law forbade
the use of nuclear weapons. Rooz, an internet newspaper run by members of Iran's reformist movement,
reported that Mohsen Gharavian, had declared "for the first time that the
use of nuclear weapons may not constitute a problem, according to Sharia."
He also said, "When the entire world is armed with nuclear weapons, it is
permissible to use these weapons as a counter-measure. According to Sharia too,
only the goal is important."
Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, hardline spiritual mentor of
President Ahmadinejad, has called publicly for the production of what he called
‘special weapons’. In his 2005 book, “The Islamic Revolution, a Surge in Political Changes in
History”, Mesbah Yazdi says, “The most advanced weapons must be produced inside our
country even if our enemies don’t like it. There is no reason that they have
the right to produce a special type of weapons, while other countries are
deprived of it.” These comments were designed for private circulation among
Iran’s senior clerical establishment.
According to source 002, the book had a very small print run, in the
hundreds, because it was not intended for public consumption. Yazdi is trying to build initial consensus on
the nuclear weapons issue among hardline clerics and politicians.
The Iranian People
In a private meeting with the Next Century Foundation on July 11th
2007, Mr Mohammed Kamali, Chairman of the Campaign against Sanctions and
Military Intervention in Iran, said, “Iranian people are very much against nuclear weapons. They
see how they are very dangerous, and how the US has often been able to coerce
nations due to its arsenal. Iranians want no nuclear weapons. They want to see
no nuclear weapons in Israel. What has the United States said regarding
those?” This was countered at the same
meeting by Mr. Turi Munthe, Associate Fellow, Royal United Services Institute,
who referred to a poll taken the day before, which showed that slightly over
50% of Iranians supported nuclear weapons.[8]
An Alternative View
In July, Allaedin Borujerdi, Chair of Iran’s Parliamentary
National Security Commission, and one of the most powerful figures in the
Conservative opposition said Iran would be willing to cease its enrichment to
20% provided fuel rods were provided for the Tehran medical research reactor.
The Mardomak website which carried this report, elicited the following response
from one of its readers in Iran named Ali. On July 5th 2010 he wrote,
“How long are we going to be stubborn? Give people the bread they need to live.
What does (nuclear) fuel matter? To hell with the atom. A regime which has been
lying to its people for years will always find a way to deceive and con its way
through…they are charlatans who continue to rule by lying and by misrepresenting
the people’s votes to their own advantage. They rule by opposing imagined
enemies (in Khamenei’s mind everyone is an enemy). If they are genuine in their
proposal to negotiate with the world, then they treat them with more respect
than they afford their own people. If they are being their usual devious
selves, what claim do they have to sincerity? How can the world trust them?”
This response gives an insight into one Iranian citizen’s
attitude to Iran’s nuclear programme and particularly the government running
it. While the
Iranian people may not support the government they do support Iran. If they believe nuclear weapons safeguard
their country they would not necessarily oppose such weapons. Following
last year’s Presidential Elections, the Iranian authorities have been severely
stretched by the effort to contain domestic dissent. Needing symbolic victories
to legitimise its iron grip, the nuclear issue is a boon to a government beleaguered
by political as well economic problems.
Comment: Western suspicions over Iran’s intention remain. The result of this was the imposition of a
fourth round of sanctions by the UN Security Council. Illustrative of the level
of distrust is the kidnapping or alleged defection of Shahram Amiri to America in
May 2009. Amiri is a nuclear scientist, whose previous work on Iran’s nuclear
programme made him a considerable asset to the CIA. Amiri ‘defected’ back to
Iran in early July. Many Americans believe Iran does aim to construct a nuclear
weapon. End comment.
[1] IAEA Board of Governors, “Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement,” IAEA: GOV/2008/15, 4,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-15.pdf.)
[4] Source 002
[5] http://www.france24.com/fr/20100409-nucleaire-liran-determine-a-poursuivre-son-programme-depit-menaces
[6] Source
002
[7]
He is a disciple of the ultra-conservative Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi
Mesbah-Yazdi, who is widely regarded as the cleric closest to Iran's new
president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,
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